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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
This survey of the large number of cases handed down by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the area of federal practice and procedure exam-
ines some of the more significant opinions including decisions on the discre-
tionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, abstention under
the ullman doctrine, and failure to join an indispensable party.
I. JURISDICTION
A. Subject Matter Jurisidiction
1. Waiver of Governmental Immunity under the Federal Tort
Claims Act
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with the question of
whether the issuance of an allegedly misleading aeronautical chart by a gov-
ernment agency fell within the discretionary function exception' of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act. 2 In Baird v. United States,3 the pilot of a small aircraft
used a government-approved aeronautical chart to make a night landing at
the Greenburg, Kansas airport. The symbols on the chart accurately indi-
cated the length of the longest runway and the availability of runway lights
from sunset to sunrise. There was no system, however, for symbolically in-
forming the pilot that the lit runway was not the longest runway, and that it
was not lit for its entire length. The plane overran the lit runway and
crashed, killing two passengers and severely injuring a third passenger and
the pilot.
4
In a split decision, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
claim on the ground that the design and approval of the chart specifications
by the government fell within the discretionary function exception and,
therefore, sovereign immunity barred the suit.5 The majority, per Judge
Seymour, relied upon Dalehite v. United States6 which broadly defined discre-
tionary judgment as "determinations made by executives or administrators
in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2860(a) (1976):
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to--
(a) any claim . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or employee
of the government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976) (waiving governmental immunity from tort claims); 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) (granting jurisdiction for such claims).
3. 653 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
4. 653 F.2d at 438.
5. Id. at 441.
6. 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (explosion of fertilizer produced according to specifications of a
government fertilizer export program held not actionable because negligent decisions were
made at a planning rather than an operational level).
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is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion."' 7 Applying this
standard to the federal agency responsible for the map's symbols, the Inter-
Agency Air Cartographic Committee (IACC),8 the court found that the
IACC's determination of the extent of detail to be included in aeronautical
charts was a discretionary design judgment. 9
By challenging the IACC's judgmental activities in formulating and ap-
proving the substantive design of the chart, the plaintiffs challenged the de-
sign of all sectional charts. The court distinguished Baird from three
categories of cases where the government's negligence has not been held to
be protected by the discretionary function exception:' 0 where negligence
has occurred in the mechanical preparation of the chart, not in the substan-
tive design;"' where the wrong symbol was used on the chart;' 2 and where
the negligence involved an activity in which only governments engage.
13
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Doyle argued that the breach of duty in-
volved was more related to a governmental operational activity than it was
to the planning function and thus, was not immune under the discretionary
function exception.' 4 Relying upon the reasoning of Indian Towing Co. v.
United States,15 Judge Doyle furthermore maintained that once the govern-
ment undertook the responsibility of publishing aeronautical charts to mini-
mize the danger of a hazardous activity, landing airplanes, it had a duty to
depict fully and accurately those features which it had chosen to portray. '
6
Judge Doyle argued this duty exists independently of any discretionary
decision. 17
7. Id. at 35-36.
8. The Inter-Agency Air Cartographic Committee is a committee formed by agreement of
the Departments of Defense and Commerce and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
develop the final detailed and authoritative specifications for flight information in textual and
chart form. 653 F.2d at 438-39.
9. Id. at 441.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Reminga v. United States, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (televison tower's
ground location inaccurately depicted on chart); Allnutt v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 832
(W.D. Mo. 1980) (aeronautical chart failed to comply with IACC standards).
12. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1971), a 'd, 463 F.2d 208
(10th Cir. 1972) (chart erroneously depicted availability of night lighting); Sullivan v. United
States, 299 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ala. 1968), affd, 411 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1969).
13. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (government held suable
for negligent operation of a lighthouse); see also Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir.
1976) (negligent failure to warn of thermal pools in undeveloped portion of Yellowstone Na-
tional Park); Yates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974) (negligent failure of FAA air
controller to allow sufficient separation of air traffic actionable).
14. 653 F.2d at 444 (Doyle, J., dissenting). The impact of Judge Doyle's argument is di-
luted by his insistence that negligent acts by definition must be excluded from "policy deci-
sions." Id. at 443-44. His definition of an "operational activity" as any activity performed
negligently circumvents the Dalehie layering of protection for decisions made at the planning
level. Judge Doyle avoids the possibility that a discretionary-function policy decision might be
made negligently, or might negligently authorize acts which, if examined independently at the
field or "operational" level, would be considered negligent. Such policy decisions, according to
the majority in Baird, are protected by sovereign immunity.
15. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
16. 653 F.2d at 445 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 444-45. Cf. Allen v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 476, 486-87 (D. Utah 1981).
Allen was a preliminary action in a suit brought by nearly 1,000 persons against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained as a result of open-air nuclear
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2. Waiver of Governmental Immunity under the Tucker Act
The Tucker Act'" waives the government's sovereign immunity for cer-
tain claims for money damages by conferring jurisdiction on the Court of
Claims, and in certain circumstances on the district courts. In the consoli-
dated case Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Bergland,'9 the Secretary of Agriculture
appealed a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff sugar companies.
The trial court had granted injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to
the eligibility of sugar as collateral for loans made as part of the price sup-
port program of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977.20 Prior to the entry
of summary judgment, however, the companies repaid the loans the govern-
ment had sought to recall.
2 1
The court of appeals held that because the loans had been repaid prior
to judgment, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
22
The court employed two rationales. First, jurisdiction over a federal ques-
tion 23 must involve a case or controversy. 24 After the loans were repaid, the
only question remaining between the companies and the Department of Ag-
riculture was the potential storage payments claim, a claim not presented by
the plaintiffs. 25 Second, the Tucker Act grants concurrent jurisdiction of
claims under $10,000 to the district courts and the Court of Claims, but gives
jurisdiction of claims over $10,000 exclusively to the Court of Claims. 2 6 The
potential storage payments claim exceeded $10,000 and, therefore, jurisdic-
testing in Nevada during 1951-62. The district court declined to allow the discretionary func-
tion exception to prevent trial on the merits because of lack of jurisdiction. The court character-
ized the issue of the scope of the discretionary function exception as a substantive issue of duty
under tort analysis, as Judge Doyle did in his dissent in Baird. Allen, 527 F. Supp. at 487. On
this basis, the court deemed the jurisdictional issues "inextricable" from the substantive claims,
and ruled that jurisdictional defenses would be determined upon a complete record. Id. at 488.
Accord Irving v. United States, 532 F. Supp. 840 (D. N.H. 1982) (personal injury suit alleging
negligent performance of compliance enforcement inspection by government officers); Barnson
v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 614 (D. Utah 1982) (Federal Tort Claims Act suits arising from
cancer deaths of uranium mine workers).
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
19. 664 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1981).
20. 7 U.S.C. § 1446(0 (Supp. IV 1980). Prior to the 1977 Act, sugar prices were supported
by a payment program which permitted the recipient processors to choose between the "last-in
first-out" (LIFO) or "first-in first-out" (FIFO) inventory accounting methods, but then required
them to adhere to their choice. The 1977 Act changed price supports to a loan program, utiliz-
ing processed sugar as collateral and guaranteeing government purchase if sugar prices fell be-
low set levels. The plaintiff sugar companies participated in the payment program under the
LIFO method, but changed to the FIFO method in fixing the amounts of sugar used as collat-
eral and thus determining the amount of the loans under the loan program. The United States
Department of Agriculture claimed that this interprogram switch in inventory methods ren-
dered the sugar ineligible as collateral for the loans and thus called for pre-maturity loan repay-
ment. 664 F.2d at 821.
21. Id. at 821-22. Repayment was made pursuant to stipulations that: a) but for the
switch in accounting methods, the sugar was eligible as collateral for the price support program;
and b) if the sugar companies won the subject litigation they would receive the benefits of the
price support programs and program extensions. Id. at 822 n.5.
22. Id. at 824.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
24. U.S. CONST. art. III.
25. 664 F.2d at 823.
26. 23 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1976).
1983]
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tion was vested in the Court of Claims. 27 "fJ]urisdiction of the Court of
Claims cannot be evaded by framing a complaint to seek only injunctive,
mandatory, or declaratory relief against governmental officials."
28
3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Barred by Statute
In Cities Service Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission ,29 the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of a challenge by nine pipeline companies to the con-
stitutionality of the Oklahoma Conservation Excise Tax,
30 as related to the
[Oklahoma] Tax Credit Act.3 1 The court based its dismissal on the jurisdic-
tional bar of the Tax Injunction Act of 1937.32
In claiming that the federal court should maintain jurisdiction of the
suit, the appellants argued that they were precluded from obtaining relief in
the Oklahoma state courts because the Oklahoma Supreme Court had previ-
ously declared the challenged tax law constitutional. 33 They relied upon
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 34 asserting that if there is uncertainty surrounding
the adequacy of the state remedy, a federal court should maintain jurisdic-
tion over the claim.
35
The court rejected this argument, holding that the likelihood of success
in state courts is not a factor in determining whether uncertainty surrounds
the adequacy of a state remedy. 36 The Tenth Circuit court relied upon the
Rosewell test, 3 7 which focuses on the procedural adequacy of the remedy,
rather than its substantive adequacy. Because the taxpayers in this case had
a right to a full hearing before the Oklahoma Tax Commission with direct
appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the Rosewell test of the opportunity
for full hearing and judicial determination of the plaintiffs' claim was met.
38
Consequently, although the taxpayers were bound to lose under Oklahoma
precedent, they were precluded from federal jurisdiction because Oklahoma
provides an adequate procedural system for adjudicating challenges to its
tax laws.
B. Abstention under the Pullman Doctrine
The Pullman doctrine39 permits a federal court to abstain from ruling in
those instances where: a) a federal constitutional claim is premised on an
unsettled question of state law; b) determination by a state court might
27. 664 F.2d at 823-24.
28. Id. at 824.
29. 656 F.2d 584 (10th Cir.), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981).
30. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 1107-1111 (West Supp. 1981-82).
31. Id. § 2357 D.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
33. Post Oak Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 575 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1978).
34. 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
35. 656 F.2d at 586.
36. Id. The court adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit's opinion in Non-Resident
Taxpayers Ass'n v. Municipality of Philadelphia, 478 F.2d 456 (3d Cir. 1973).
37. Rosewell v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981).
38. 656 F.2d at 587.
39. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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avoid or modify the constitutional issue; or c) important state policies might
be disrupted by an erroneous decision of the federal court.40 This abstention
doctrine is an extraordinary exception to a court's duty to adjudicate cases
before it, and as such, must be construed narrowly.
41
In Vrnyard v. King 4 2 the trial court abstained from hearing a case in
which the plaintiff claimed that the termination of her employment at an
Oklahoma state hospital violated her due process rights. The trial court
found Oklahoma law unclear with respect to the existence of a property in-
terest in continued employment. 43 The appellate court reversed, based upon
its determination of the clarity of Oklahoma state law.44 The court thereby
declined to broaden the Pullman doctrine.
45
Utilizing the Third Circuit's three-pronged test, 46 the court found
Oklahoma law settled on the question of when a property interest is cre-
ated,4 7 although difficult to apply to the instant facts. 48 The court also
found that no interference with important state programs would be caused
by an erroneous federal adjudication.
4 9
In University of Oklahoma Gay People's Union v. Board of Regents,5° the Tenth
Circuit reiterated earlier guidance to the lower courts 5 1 concerning the ap-
propriate application of the Pullman doctrine. The suit challenged the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma Board of Regents' non-recognition of a homosexual
group as a student organization. The trial court dismissed the federal action
in view of a parallel action pending in the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
5 2
The appellate court agreed that there were grounds for abstention, stat-
ing that state court resolution "in a particular way"'5 3 would leave no re-
maining constitutional issues. Nevertheless, it reversed the lower court's
dismissal, stating that the proper action would be to reinstate the case on the
docket and defer further action until state law issues were resolved in the
40. See D'Iorio v. County of Delaware, 592 F.2d 681, 686 (3d Cir. 1978). See generally Field,
Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
1071 (1974).
41. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959).
42. 655 F.2d 1016 (10th Cir. 1981).
43. The sufficiency of a property interest triggering constitutional due process considera-
tions is determined by state law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976).
44. 655 F.2d at 1019.
45. Id. at 1021.
46. The court relied upon the test set forth in D'Iorio v. County of Delaware, 592 F.2d 681,
686 (3d Cir. 1978).
47. Singh v. City Serv. Oil Co., 554 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1976) (circumstances under which
employment contracts are terminable at will); Nation v. Chism, 154 Okla. 50, 6 P.2d 766 (1931)
(general property right in employment not recognized).
48. The case involved a claimed implied contract between a coordinator of volunteer serv-
ices and a hospital.
49. 655 F.2d at 1020. The court distinguished the non-renewal of non-tenured teacher
contract cases on the basis that education is primarily a function of the state. Id. at 1020 n.7.
50. 661 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1981).
51. E.g., Arrow v. Dow, 636 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1980); Western Food Plan, Inc. v. MacFar-
lane, 588 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1978). See also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 244 n.4 (1967).
52. The federal court parties stipulated that the state court action had identical circum-
stances and issues and that the purposes of the plaintiff organizations in the federal and state
cases were identical although the membership lists were different. 661 F.2d at 859.
53. Id. at 860.
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state court. 54 The court noted that caveats for deferral of federal court ac-
tion are: a) unfair added expense to the litigants (not an issue in this case);
or b) extended delay (to which the court directed the lower court's
attention) .55
C. Jurisdiction over Interlocutory Appeal
The collateral order doctrine56 provides a narrow exception to the gen-
eral requirement of a final judgment as a prerequisite to appellate review.
57
Coopers &Lybrandv. L'vesay58 provides a three-pronged test of the appealabil-
ity of orders: a) the order must conclusively determine the issue in question;
b) it must resolve an important issue completely separable from the merits of
the action; and c) it must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final
judgment. 59
The Tenth Circuit faced a difficult issue in applying the collateral order
doctrine in Cotner v. Mason.6° The appellant sought review of a district court
order denying his motion for appointment of counsel in a civil action. The
Tenth Circuit followed its own precedent 61 and dismissed the appeal based
on lack of jurisdiction of a non-final order. The court reasoned that if the
appellant were unsuccessfulpro se at the trial court level, he could appeal the
lack of appointed counsel as part of the final judgment. Post-judgment re-
versal and a new trial could remedy any injury to his asserted right. Thus,
the third prong of the test of the appealability of an interlocutory order was
not satisfied. 62 The appellant did not suffer irreparable injuries or lose a
crucial collateral claim because of the court's denial of an immediate review
of the order.
63
The Tenth Circuit's holding on this issue places it in disagreement with
five other circuits.64 The court used a practical approach, finding that the
appointment of counsel was similar to numerous other pretrial orders which
eventually can be remedied by a full appellate review. 65 The court noted
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. This exception was first articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
58. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
59. Id. at 468.
60. 657 F.2d 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
61. May v. Jones, No. 79-1774 (10th Cir. June 23, 1980); Kennedy v. Burk, No. 79-1616
(10th Cir. Nov. 16, 1979); Nevarez v. Shaw, No. 76-1424 (10th Cir. Nov. 16, 1976) (absent
extraordinary circumstances, orders denying appointment of counsel in civil cases are not imme-
diately appealable as of right).
62. 657 F.2d at 1391.
63. Set Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981). See also Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.ll (1976).
64. "[A] decision on appellant's need for counsel must be made before the trial if it is to be
of any practical effect to him." Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981). See Jones v.
WFYR Radio/RKO Gen., 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980); Hudak v. Curators of the Univ. of
Mo., 586 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 556 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 964 (1962).
65. 657 F.2d at 1392.
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the strong judicial policy against "piecemeal appellate disposition of what is,
in practical consequence, but a single controversy."6 6
II. VENUE
In Hospah Coal Co. v. Chaco Energ Co. ,67 the court settled a dispute in-
volving pre-trial procedural maneuvering by the defendants. Chaco Energy
Co. and Texas Utilities Co. sued Santa Fe Industries (SFI) and several of its
subsidiaries in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas for conspiracy, violation of antitrust laws, and common law fraud in
the inducement, requesting declaratory judgment, rescission of contracts, in-
junctive relief, and treble damages. 68 SFI and the other defendants re-
sponded by filing an action in the United States District Court of New
Mexico seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting the
plaintiffs from proceeding further in the Texas action. The defendants
based their request on a venue selection clause in a lease between the parties
that provided for venue in New Mexico.6 9 Finding that the Texas action
was vexatious, the district court granted the defendants' injunction. SFI
then went to Texas and entered a motion to stay or, in the alternative, to
dismiss the Texas action.70 Because the New Mexico injunction prevented
Chaco from a Texas court-ordered response to the defendants' motion to
stay, Chaco went to New Mexico and requested suspension of the injunction.
The New Mexico District Court refused, 71 and Chaco appealed to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Tenth Circuit court stayed the New Mexico injunction pending
appeal and expedited the hearing. 72 It found the ultimate issue to be:
which district court (Northern Texas or New MeXico) shall make a determi-
nation on the issue of venue?
73
The general rule is that when two courts have concurrent jurisdiction,
the first court in which jurisdiction attaches has priority to consider the
case, 74 except in cases involving a misuse of litigation through vexatious and
oppressive foreign suits. 75 SFI claimed that jurisdiction first attached in
New Mexico because service of process was achieved for the New Mexico
action first. The court, however, followed Tenth Circuit precedent 76 and
ruled that jurisdiction relates back to the filing of the complaint, and thus it
66. Id. (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974)).
67. 673 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2299 (1982).
68. 673 F.2d at 1162.
69. Id. Apparently, SF1 feared being "home-towned" in a Texas federal court because the
outcome of the litigation would affect Texas consumers. The Tenth Ciruit dismissed this argu-
ment, thus deferring to the ability of the district court to decide if it should accept venue. Id. at
1164 n.3.
70. Id. at 1162.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1163.
73. Id.
74. O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Lambert, 459 F.2d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1972).
75. Id.




attached first in the Texas district court. 77 The court found that the Texas
litigation was not vexatious, but involved a question of fact as to the applica-
bility of the venue selection clause.
78
The appellate court ruled that "the court which first obtains jurisdic-
tion should first decide issues of venue."'79 It supported its holding with one
of the cases relied upon by SFI, Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-O- Two Co. 
80
Kerotest warns against mechanical solution of multiple litigation problems.8 t
The appellate court agreed with the principle of flexibility in determining
which court has jurisdiction over the merits. Nevertheless, it found that the
Kerotest Court paid deference to the district court's ability to determine the
proper venue.
8 2
Judge Barrett, writing for the court, admonished the defendants that
rule 12(b) provides a procedure for objecting to improper venue,8 3 and 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides a procedure for requesting a change of venue.
8 4
He stated that it was improper to object to venue by filing suit for injunctive
relief in a separate forum: declaratory judgments cannot be used as "yet
another weapon in a game of procedural warfare."8 5 The court remanded
the case to the New Mexico District Court with instructions to dismiss the
preliminary injunction which restrained the plaintiffs from proceeding in the
Northern Texas District Court.
III. CLAIMS AND CLAIMANTS
A. Failure to Join an Indispensable Party
1. Interpretation of a Workmen's Compensation Statute
In Miller v. .Leavenworth-Jefferson Electric Cooperative, Inc. ,86 the plaintiff
was awarded damages for injuries suffered when the boom on the truck he
was operating touched one of the defendant's high-voltage power lines.8 7 In
a post-trial motion, the defendant claimed that the plaintiffs employer was
an indispensable party whose Kansas citizenship destroyed complete diver-
sity between the California plaintiff and itself, a Kansas electric cooperative,
thus defeating federal court jurisdiction.8 The plaintiff cross-moved to dis-
miss the employer as an unnecessary party under rule 2189 and the district
court ruled in favor of this motion.
On appeal, the defendant pointed out that the plaintiffs employer was
77. 673 F.2d at 1163.
78. Id. The court also gave the district court guidance in settling those questions of fact.
Id. at 1163 n.2. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (enforceability of
venue selection clauses).
79. 673 F.2d at 1164.
80. 342 U.S. 180 (1952).
81. Id. at 183.
82. 673 F.2d at 1164.
83. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
85. 673 F.2d at 1164-65.
86. 653 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1981).
87. Id. at 1379.
88. Id. at 1380.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 21.
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named in the pleadings as a party bringing the action, pursuant to the Kan-
sas workmen's compensation statute.90 Had the employer not been named,
the plaintiff, who filed the lawsuit more than one year after the accident
occurred, would have been precluded from bringing his action because of
the statute of limitations.9 1 The workmen's compensation statute allows an
employer to bring an action within two years of the accident if the employee
fails to do so.92 The defendant argued that if the employer was required to
be named as a party in order to bring the action, it was an indispensable
party.
93
The appellate court disagreed, finding the employer was not a necessary
party under rule 19.9 4 It held there was no abuse of discretion by the district
court in dismissing the employer under rule 21.95
2. Status of Producers under an Oil and Gas Field Unit Agreement
In Francis Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Exxon Corp. ,96 the court also faced the issue of
failure to join indispensable parties who would destroy diversity jurisdiction.
The plaintiff was one of 194 producers in a unit oil production field in Texas.
Under the unit agreement, his percentage of cost and production was allo-
cated based on tract size, but his actual output of high-priced stripper oil
was a much greater percentage than that of the unit as a whole. The unit
had been formed among large producers, with the plaintiff as a small pro-
ducer subsequently joining under protest. Exxon had separate purchasing
contracts with each of the unit's producers, including the plaintiff.9 7 Plain-
tiff brought suit against Exxon for the difference between the value of his
actual output of stripper oil and the amount paid by Exxon under the
formula imposed by the unit.
Exxon moved for summary judgment based on failure to join all the
working interests of the unit as indispensable parties.98 The district court
dismissed the case for failure to join indispensable parties who would destroy
diversity jurisdiction otherwise enjoyed by the plaintiffs.
The appellate court reversed, directing that a hearing9 9 be held to ac-
cept evidence which would aid resolution of rule 19 issues. The court found
that because of the dearth of facts on the record, it was impossible to deter-
mine whether all 194 members of the unit were indispensable parties. 10°
Among the matters to be ascertained by the trial court on remand was
90. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-504 (1963 & Supp. 1981).
91. Id § 44-504(b).
92. Id. § 44-504(c).
93. 653 F.2d at 1381.
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
95. "Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of
its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just." FED. R. Civ. P. 21.
Se. also Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 528 F. Supp. 391, 403 (D. Kan. 1981)
(non-diverse defendants may be dismissed from a case under rule 21 for the preservation of
diversity jurisdiction).
96. 661 F.2d 873 (10th Cir. 1981).
97. Id. at 874-75.
98. Id. at 875.
99. Id. at 879-80.
100. Id. at 880.
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whether some of the interests were so small that they should not be forced to
litigate. 0 '
B. Class Actions
1. Class Certification to Avoid Mootness
In Quintana v. Harris,'0 2 the plaintiff brought an action to compel the
Department of Health and Human Services to rule on Supplemental Secur-
ity Income benefit applications within sixty days. Although the plaintiff had
requested class certification in an effort to avoid mootness problems, the trial
court dismissed the suit as moot. 103 The Tenth Circuit remanded for consid-
eration of plaintiff's requested class certification.' 0 4 On remand, the trial
court then found that there existed a potential conflict of interest among the
proposed class, denied class certification, and again dismissed plaintiff's indi-
vidual claim as moot.
0 5
Plaintiff filed a timely rule 59(e)106 motion to alter or amend the judg-
ment denying class certification, proposing a subclass which would avoid the
conflict of interest existing in the original class. The district court denied the
motion without comment, 10 7 and plaintiff appealed.
The Tenth Circuit again remanded the case for the district court to
consider the merits of plaintiff's proposed subclasses. It relied upon the re-
cent Supreme Court case of United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty,'0 8
which approved an appellate court order requiring a district court to consid-
er sua sponte the possibility of certifying subclasses, thus permitting class pro-
ponents an opportunity to bear the burden of constructing proposed
subclasses. 10 9 Because the plaintiff had actually requested certification of
subclasses in the case before it, the Tenth Circuit held under Geraghty that
the trial court's unexplained denial of the plaintiff's motion was "afortiori an
abuse of the discretion enjoyed by the District Court under 59(e). '" 10
Chief Judge Seth dissented, urging the case be remanded for the limited
purpose of permitting the trial court to make findings or express specific
reasons why the subclass certification was denied by the order entered in
response to the rule 59(e) motion."' He declined to assume that the district
court had not considered the proposed subclasses, but preferred to character-
101. Id.
102. 663 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1981).
103. Id. at 79.
104. Quintana v. Califano, 623 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1979). The Tenth Circuit also re-
manded the suit for determination of when mootness arose for purposes of the relation back
doctrine of Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.l 1 (1975).
105. The trial court believed that some members might not wish to compel early adjudica-
tion because of its possible adverse effect on the quality of the Secretary's deliberations.
Quintana v. Harris, 88 F.R.D. 132, 133-34 (D.N.M. 1980).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
107. 663 F.2d at 79.
108. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
109. Id. at 408.
110. 663 F.2d at 80.
Ill. Id. at 81 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 60:2
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
ize the problem as the omission of an explanation or rationale for the court's
action.
2. Intervention as a Class Member into Pending Litigation
The dismissal of a proposed class action against the Board of Education
of Topeka for failure to comply with the desegregation order of Brown v.
Board of Education 1 2 was considered by the Tenth Circuit in Miller v. Board of
Education. 113 The trial court followed its own precedent'" 4 in holding that
because the original Brown v. Board of Education case" 15 was still pending, in-
tervention was the proper procedure for presenting a claim that the Supreme
Court's desegregation order had not been followed.
The appellate court agreed that because the district court still had juris-
diction of the original case, intervention was the proper procedure for the
plaintiffs to use. The court quoted with approval the trial court's Memoran-
dum and Order which stated that judicial economy and the risk of inconsis-
tent judgments were policy reasons underlying its dismissal of the proposed
class action." ,
6
C. Petition under Fictitious Name
In Coe v. United States District Court,' ' 7 the petitioner brought a manda-
mus action in which he alleged that the district court had abused its discre-
tion in denying his request for anonymity. He also appealed the court's
denial of his motion for amended complaint, in which he requested that, if
his true name were used, the complaint and other pleadings be placed under
seal.' 8 The petitioner was a physician who was investigated by the State
Board of Medical Examiners (Board) for professional misconduct." 19 The
Board refused to withhold publicizing the formal complaint against the doc-
tor.' 20 Thereafter, the physician filed a section 1983 action seeking a declar-
atory judgment and injunctive relief against the Board to prevent it from
conducting the public proceeding.'
2'
The district court held that the public interest in knowing the identity
of the physician outweighed his individual privacy interest. 122 In his man-
112. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1) (racial discrimination in public education is unconstitu-
tional); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I) (directives for implementation of the original decision).
113. 667 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
114. Brown v. Board of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 383 (D. Kan. 1979).
115. Brown v. Board of Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan. 1955).
116. 667 F.2d at 948.
117. 676 F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1982).
118. Id. at 413.
119. The formal complaint prepared by the Attorney General included charges of sexual or
immoral improprieties. Id. at 412.
120. The Board had offered to conduct a non-public hearing on the condition the doctor
suspend his practice of medicine until after the Board had heard and decided the case. The
doctor refused, claiming that his practice would be irreparably harmed during the estimated 90
days that the process takes. Id. at 413 (quoting District Court Order of Mar. 4, 1982).
121. The plaintiff alleged deprivation of his fourteenth amendment due process rights, spe-
cifically irreparable harm to himself, his reputation, and his property interests. 676 F.2d at 412.
122. Id. at 414. The district court also expressed reservations concerning federal court juris-
diction. It suggested that the proper form for the plaintiff to challenge a state board's action
19831
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
damus action before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the physician
claimed that by refusing to allow him to bring the suit anonymously, the
district court had foreclosed his right to a fair or meaningful opportunity to
present his federal constitutional claims in a federal court.'
23
The Tenth Circuit denied the writ of mandamus, finding that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the petitioner to
proceed under a pseudonym. The court relied upon its decision in Lindsey v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp. ,124 which concluded that the use of pseudonyms is "an
unusual procedure, to be allowed only where there is an important private
interest to be recognized." 1 25 Rule 10(a) expressly requires the names of all
parties to appear in the complaint.
126
In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the physician's pri-
vate interest in anonymity, the court examined the statutory purpose of the
legislation which created the Board. This statute declares that the regula-
tion of the practice of medicine is intended so "that the people shall be prop-
erly protected against unauthorized, unqualified, and improper practice of
the healing arts in this state."' 2 7 In view of this legislative purpose and the
absence of any abuse of discretion on the part of the Board, the court found
that the public proceedings against Dr. Coe did not violate any due process
rights.' 2 8 Further, the court ruled that because the public interest was para-
mount, the plaintiff did not have a right to have his pleadings placed under
seal. 129
IV. DISCOVERY AND PRETRIAL
A. Preiminary Injunctions
Whether the denial of a preliminary injunction was sufficient basis for
granting summary judgment was one of the issues in Thompson v. Kerr-McGee
Refmig Co. 130 The plaintiff, a service station operator, sued under the Pe-
troleum Marketing Practices Act 13 1 (the Act) for the unlawful nonrenewal of
his franchise by Kerr-McGee. Under this Act, a court must issue a prelimi-
nary injunction if the franchisee shows: 1) the franchise has been termi-
nated; 2) the existence of "sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to
make such questions a fair ground for litigation;" and 3) the issuance of a
preliminary injunction would impose less hardship on the franchisor than on
was in state court. Id. (quoting District Court Order of Mar. 4, 1982). Judge Barrett and Judge
Logan shared this concern. 676 F.2d at 418 n.2. Judge McKay did not concur in this footnote,
but dismissed it as dicta. Id. at 418 (McKay, J., concurring).
123. 676 F.2d at 413.
124. 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1979).
125. Id. at 1125.
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
127. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-102 (1973).
128. 676 F.2d at 417.
129. Id. at 418. The court distinguished Coe from its opinion in Crystal Grower's Corp. v.
Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1980), on the basis that Crystal Grower's involved "non-disclo-
sure, secrecy considerations arising from invocation of the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine, when there were no competing public interests." 676 F.2d at 418.
130. 660 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 2801 (Supp. IV 1980).
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the franchisee without it. 13 2 Without elaboration, the trial court dissolved
the temporary injunction against the franchisor.133 After a trial on the mer-
its, a jury awarded damages to the franchisee.
134
On appeal, Kerr-McGee argued that the district court, by dissolving the
temporary injunction, had implicitly determined that there were no material
issues of fact.1 35 Kerr-McGee submitted to the appellate panel that the basis
for the lower court's denial of the preliminary injunction must have been the
nonexistence of "sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make
such questions a fair ground for litigation."' 136 In such circumstances, it ar-
gued summary judgment was appropriate. Kerr-McGee also contended that
its rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should have
been granted.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. Although emphasizing
that the situation was unusual, the court ruled the district court did not err
in denying the appellant's motions for summary judgment and failure to
state a claim. 137 The court distinguished the plaintiffs burden of proof at a
hearing for a preliminary injunction from the burden of proof required at a
trial on the merits. 138 At a preliminary injunction hearing a plaintiff must
only establish that success on the merits is probable. Thus, a plaintiff may
not present all of the evidence at the hearing, perhaps because of litigation
strategy or because the case is not yet fully developed. 139 It would be unfair
to the plaintiff to transform a hearing for a preliminary injunction into a




1. Payment of the Discovery Costs of a Subpoenaed Non-party
Florida v. Kerr-McGee' 4' involved a protective order in a multi-district anti-
trust action against several large oil companies, which alleged price fixing,
creation of artificial scarcity, and monopoly of the petroleum industry.
142
The suit was consolidated with similar suits brought by other states in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California for coordi-
nated pretrial proceedings.1
43
Discovery against non-parties to the antitrust action was authorized by
order of the California judge supervising the coordinated pretrial proceed-
132. 15 U.S.C. § 2805(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
133. 660 F.2d at 1387.
134. d. at 1382.
135. Id. at 1386.
136. Id. at 1387 (quoting the second prong of the standard set forth in 15 U.S.C.
§ 2805(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980)).
137. 660 F.2d at 1388.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see 7 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.04 (4) (2d ed.
1982).
140. 660 F.2d at 1388. See Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc., 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1978).
141. 669 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1982).




ings. 144 The State of Florida served Kerr-McGee, a non-party to the suit,
with notice of deposition and a subpoena duces tecum for production of cer-
tain documents relating to the purchase, refining, and marketing of crude oil
and petroleum products by Kerr-McGee and its subsidiaries. 145 The sub-
poena was eighteen pages long and contained thirteen categories of docu-
ments. 146 It cost Kerr-McGee almost $8,800 to produce the requested
materials.'
4 7
Prior to delivering the requested documents, Kerr-McGee moved for a
protective order conditioning the production of the documents upon the
payment by Florida of the discovery costs. The District Court for the West-
ern District of Oklahoma granted the motion and Florida appealed.148
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, per Judge McWilliams, affirmed
the trial court's order, finding that there was no abuse of discretion.' 49 The
court made three points in its analysis of the case. First, because Kerr-Mc-
Gee was not attempting to quash the subpoena, but merely requesting lim-
ited protection, its burden as movant was less stringent. 150 Second, the court
noted that Florida's argument that these costs were relatively insignificant to
a corporation the size of Kerr-McGee cut both ways since Florida was not
"penniless" either.' 5 1
Most importantly, the court held that because Kerr-McGee was not a
party to the underlying antitrust action, its response to the subpoena would
not inure to its benefit. 152 The court reasoned that although the discovery
rules do not distinguish between parties to the action and non-parties, 153 a
district court, using the discretion granted to it under rule 26(c), "should
[not] be reluctant to place the costs of discovery upon the party deriving
benefit therefrom."' 154 The court found that in this situation, the burdens
flowed to Kerr-McGee, while the benefits flowed to Florida.155
2. Attorney's Lien after Withdrawal from Representation
The adjudication of a fee dispute between a lawyer and his clients was
at issue inJenkins v. Weznshzenk. '5 6 The lawyer, Jenkins, had gathered impor-
tant information for his clients' defense in a civil action pending before Dis-
trict Judge Weinshienk, Woodworth v. Stanley Vacation Club, Inc. 157 His clients




147. Id. at 622-23.
148. Id. at 622.
149. Id. at 624.




154. Id. at 624 n.3; see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). In its footnote, the court noted the Ninth
Circuit's agreement with this position. See Dart Indus. Co. v. Westwood Chem. Co., 649 F.2d
646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980).
155. 669 F.2d at 624.
156. 670 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1982).
157. No. 81-818 (D. Colo. filed May 22, 1981) (default judgment entered Nov. 5, 1982).
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to force his clients to pay their legal bills, Jenkins petitioned the trial court to
withdraw from the Woodworth case. He refused, however, to hand over the
files containing the essential information for his clients' pending litigation
until they paid him his fees, including approximately $3,500 for work on the
Woodworth case. 1 58
Judge Weinshienk conditioned the withdrawal order on Jenkins either
delivering the files to the substituted counsel or permitting the substituted
counsel to photocopy the files. The judge later amended her order to require
the clients to post a bond for $3,500 as security for the attorney's lien on the
unpaid fees in the Woodworth case.' 59
The attorney petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for manda-
mus relief.160 He claimed that under Colorado law, an attorney has a re-
taining lien' 6' on all of his clients' papers until he is paid in full for his legal
work, including amounts owed for matters unrelated to the litigation before
the court. He argued that the trial court's refusal to recognize the full extent
of the lien deprived him of a property right without due process of law.'
62
The appellate court determined that with limited exceptions, a trial
court has ancillary jurisdiction163 over the legal fees owed to an attorney
only "with respect to work done in the suit being litigated."' 64 The court noted
that to hold otherwise would open the federal courts to fee litigation.'
6 5
Finding the trial court had limited jurisdiction over the fee dispute, the
court held that under Colorado law, Jenkins had a retaining lien for the
Woodworth fees.1 66 The court refused to emasculate the "power and bite" of
the attorney's lien because of its inconvenience to the clients. 167 Thus, the
court directed the trial court to permit the lawyer to withhold the papers or
to require the clients to post a bond sufficient to protect Jenkins' lien.' 68
158. Jenkins, 670 F.2d at 917.
159. Id.
160. Id. The court found that this was an appropriate case for mandamus. The court drew
an analogy to cases where a party claims a privilege not to disclose information. In such cases,
waiting to appeal until a final decision is rendered provides an inadequate remedy. Id.
161. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-5-120 (1973).
162. 670 F.2d at 917.
163. Id. at 918. The court relied upon the test for ancillary jurisdiction articulated in Mor-
row v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969):
[AIncillary jurisdiction should attach where: (1) the ancillary matter arises from the
same transaction which was the basis of the main proceeding, or arises during the
course of the main matter; (2) the ancillary matter can be determined without a sub-
stantive new fact-finding proceeding; (3) determination of the ancillary matter
through an ancillary order would not deprive a party of a substantive procedural or
substantive right, and (4) the ancillary matter must be settled to protect the integrity
of the main proceeding or to insure that the disposition in the main proceeding will
not be frustrated.
164. 670 F.2d at 918 (emphasis in original). Cf. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Mercury
Typesetting Co., 323 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1963); see Note, Attorney's Retaining Lien over Former
Chent's Papers, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 296 (1965).
165. 670 F.2d at 919.
166. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-5-120 (1973). See also Collins v. Thuringer, 92 Colo. 433, 21
P.2d 709 (1933).




C. Dismissal with Prejudice
Injoph'n v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. ,169 the appellate court found
the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice the cause of
action of apro se claimant because of lack of prosecution. The plaintiff had
failed to file a pretrial memorandum with the court, despite the district
court's warning that this would constitute sufficient grounds for dismissal of
the suit. 1 70 The trial court dismissed the action, but failed to set forth its
factual findings, judicial considerations, and legal reasoning in its order of
dismissal.' 17 In considering the severity of the sanction of dismissal with
prejudice, the appellate court examined the United States Supreme Court's
definition of "discretion:" "[J]udicial action . . . exercised not arbitrarily or
willfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circum-
stances and the law, and directed by reason and the conscience of the judge
to a just result.' 1 72 Using this standard, the Tenth Circuit court found the
trial court had abused its discretion.
V. APPEALS
A. Standards of Review
1. Interpretation of State Law
The standard of review for federal district court interpretation of state
law in diversity cases received careful attention by Judge Logan, joined by
Judge McKay in Evans v. C.E. Lumus Co.
1 73
An employee of an indemnified sub-contractor working on construction
of the processing plant of a Wyoming trona mine was injured. The district
court in Wyoming, in a case of first impression, applied a state statute invali-
dating indemnity contracts for personal injury or death or property loss or
damage due to negligence or accident at mining operations, 174 and ruled the
indemnity agreement void and unenforceable as against public policy.
The court articulated its standard of appellate review: "When a case in
diversity involves the interpretation of a state statute, and there exist no au-
thorities on point, the views of the federal district judge who is a resident of
the state where the controversy arose carry extraordinary persuasive force,
and will not be overturned unless 'clearly erroneous.' ,,175
Judge Logan's criticism of the "clearly erroneous" standard distin-
guished between review of the trial court's findings of fact, in which the
"clearly erroneous" standard is suitable,' 76 from its statements of law, in
which it is not. He cited criticism of the Tenth Circuit position on this mat-
169. 671 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1982).
170. Id. at 1275.
171. Id. at 1276.
172. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931).
173. -No. 80-1455 (10th Cir. Nov. 16, 1981) (Logan and McKay, JJ., concurring.)
174. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-131 to -132 (1977).
175. No. 80-1455, slip op. at 4.
176. Id at I (Logan, J., concurring). He added that rule 54(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure does not limit review of a trial court's conclusions of law to a "clearly erroneous"
standard. I. at I n. 1.
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ter by leading commentators 177 and cases in which the United States
Supreme Court intimated the appropriateness of a lesser standard.178 He
reminded the court that it had applied the "clearly erroneous" standard in-
consistently in the past, sometimes substituting other language.1
79
Judge Logan's fundamental concern is that by adopting a "clearly erro-
neous" standard, the court of appeals precludes itself from independent re-
view of the district court's interpretation of the state law in diversity cases,
however capable that interpretation may be, thus foreclosing the litigant's
right of appeal on that issue. 180
2. Rulings on 60(b) Motions to Set Aside a Default Judgment
In Thompson v. Kerr-McGee, the appellate court referred to rule 60(b) as
giving a court "a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a partic-
ular case," and urged liberal construction to serve "substantial justice."' 8 '
Nevertheless, in Barla v. Long,' 82 the court found the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the defendant's rule 60(b) motion to set aside a
default judgment.
Over a period of ten months, the defendant-appellants did not respond
to repeated court notices, letters, and orders for response to interrogatories in
a suit alleging common law fraud and securities fraud arising from an oil
well venture.183 Defendants changed attorneys but were at all times repre-
sented by counsel. 18 4 The plaintiffs moved for a default judgment, and after
a hearing, the district court entered a default judgment for $234,360 com-
pensatory damages and $50,000 punitive damages.
185
Defendants filed a rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment on the
ground of excusable neglect and a motion to permit answers and counter-
claims to be filed. These motions were denied. Two and a half months after
judgment, the defendants appealed the default judgment and the denial of
the rule 60(b) motion.1
86
The appellate court first ruled that filing a rule 60(b) motion with the
trial court does not toll the time in which an appeal from judgment may be
177. Id. at 2. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2588,
at 752 (1971); IA J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 0.309 (2) n.28 (2d ed. 1982).
178. No. 80-1455, slip op. at 3 (Logan, J., concurring). Such Supreme Court cases using
lesser standards include: Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956) ("special
weight"); Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 630 (1946) ("great deference");
Retiz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 39 (1941) ("great weight"). Set also Thompson v. Consol. Gas
Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 74-75 (1937).
179. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has used such standards as "carry extraordinary
force;" "substantial or great weight;" "some weight;" and even "deference." No. 80-1455, slip
op. at 2, (Logan, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 3-4.
181. 660 F.2d 1380, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981). See FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b). The court also cau-
tioned that the motion to vacate should not serve as a substitute for appeal on the merits or a
means of extending the time in which an appeal may be taken. 1d.
182. 670 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1982).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 909.
185. d. at 908-09.
186. Id. at 909.
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taken, and therefore, the appeal was not timely.'8 7 In its examination of the
trial court's denial of the defendants' request to set aside the default judg-
ment, the court stated three requirements for the movant to set aside a de-
fault judgment under rule 60(b): 1) diligent effort to seek relief under rule
60(b) by filing the motion within a reasonable time; 2) demonstration that
there was a good or acceptable reason for the default; and 3) a showing of a
meritorious defense by more than bare conclusory statements unsupported
by facts.' 88
The court ruled that the defendants' failures to comply with the orders
of the court were deliberate. 8 9 The court summarily dismissed the defend-
ants' contentions that the withdrawal of their counsel and their resulting
confusion were sufficient excuses for their failure to answer the interrogato-
ries. The court noted that such contentions overlooked the several orders,
notices, and letters they received before the motion for sanctions was filed.
The record showed that the defendants were represented at all times by
counsel. Most revealing was the evidence that the individual defendants
were experienced in litigation, and were concomitantly trying to set aside a
similar default in another jurisdiction.t°9
Jeanne E Herrick-Stare
187. Id. The early case of United States v. Schlotfeldt, 136 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1943) was
specifically discounted as authority for this issue, based on 7 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.29 (2d ed. 1982). See also II C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2871 (1973).
188. Barla, 670 F.2d at 909. See In Re Stone, 588 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1978); Gomes v.
Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970).
189. 670 F.2d at 909.
190. Id.
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